

Ethical Decision Making Surveyed through the Lens of Moral Imagination

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Abstract: This paper attempts to build on the contribution to moral imagination theory by Patricia Werhane by further integrating moral imagination with new theoretical developments that have taken place in the business ethics field. To accomplish this objective, part one will review the concept of moral imagination, from its definitional origins to its full theoretical conceptualization. Part two will provide a brief literature review of how moral imagination has been applied in empirical research. Part three will analyze and apply the construct of moral imagination as it relates to the key process stages of ethical decision making including awareness, judgment, intention, and behavior. Immoral imagination is then discussed, along with other behavioral ethics concepts as they relate to moral imagination. The paper concludes with potential future research directions, as well as teaching and managerial implications for the moral imagination construct.

Key Words: Please provide a list of key words for your article.

Introduction

Business ethics scholar Patricia Werhane develops a theoretical basis for moral imagination and demonstrates how it can have practical implications for individual managers as well as for organizational-level decision making. Her contribution to the concept of moral imagination includes a series of journal articles (Werhane 1998, 2002, 2006; Werhane and Moriarty 2009) along with her seminal book *Moral Imagination and Management Decision-Making* (1999). In its most simplistic terms, Werhane (1999: 5) defines moral imagination as

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follows: "Moral imagination entails the ability to understand [a particular] context or set of activities from a number of different perspectives, the actualizing of new possibilities that are not context-dependent, and the instigation of the process of evaluating those possibilities from a moral point of view."

Werhane's contribution has had an important impact on the business ethics field and ethical decision making in particular. According to Rozuel (2012), Werhane's work on moral imagination has had a strong influence on current research in the area of ethics, imagination and organizations. Carroll (2001) regards Werhane's book (1999) as providing a significant contribution that opens up a completely new way of thinking about ethics in management decision making. Malloy (2000: 561) suggests that Werhane's approach to decision making "adds a new dimension to the repertoire of all managers who are interested in seeking comprehensive ethical solutions to problems."

While moral imagination has, primarily through the works of Werhane, achieved recognized status as a tool for research and the teaching of business ethics, the concept may not however have realized its full potential in relation to helping understand and explain the process of ethical decision-making. According to Crane and Matten (2010), moral imagination has not yet been included in typical models of ethical decision making. In terms of empirical research, despite much theoretical work proposing the antecedents of moral imagination in organizations, Whitaker and Godwin (2013) believe that such discussions have largely been inferential and conceptual in nature with a scarcity of empirical findings. McVea (2009) goes even further, suggesting that the concept of moral imagination has remained an abstract ethical concept. Thus, as the theoretical (see Treviño et al. 2006; Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008) and empirical literature (see O'Fallon and Butterfield 2005; Craft 2013; Lehnert et al. 2015) on ethical decision making continues to develop, moral imagination may have been somewhat left behind. Nonetheless, moral imagination is considered to be a new issue for inclusion in terms of its influence on ethical decision making with considerable explanatory potential (Crane and Matten 2010).

This paper attempts to build on Werhane's significant contribution in addition to the many other contributors to moral imagination theory and research by further integrating moral imagination with new theoretical developments that have taken place in the business ethics field. To accomplish this objective, this paper will consist of four parts. Part one will review the concept of moral imagination, from its definitional origins to its full theoretical conceptualization provided by Werhane. Part two will provide a brief literature review of how moral imagination has been applied in empirical research since Werhane

initially linked moral imagination to managerial and organizational ethical decision making. Part three, as the heart of the paper, will analyze and apply the construct of moral imagination as it relates to the key process stages of ethical decision-making theory (see Rest 1984, 1986; Moberg and Seabright 2000; Seabright and Schminke 2002) including: (1) awareness; (2) judgment; (3) intention; and (4) behavior. Following an analysis of each process stage, immoral imagination will be discussed, as well as other behavioral ethics concepts as they relate to moral imagination. Part four will conclude the paper with potential future research directions, as well as teaching and managerial implications for Werhane's moral imagination construct.

The ultimate goal of the paper is to build on Werhane's important contribution and further develop and apply moral imagination in a more robust manner to the ethical decision-making process. In doing so, the construct of moral imagination will then hopefully better assist students, employees, managers, and executives to not only realize they are facing ethical issues, but to understand the moral implications of all of the possible alternatives, putting decision-makers in a stronger position to then actualize their moral judgments.

Part One: What is Moral Imagination?

To date, there remains no clear agreement among scholars on an appropriate definition of moral imagination, although several attempts have been made (Godwin 2015). This may have also contributed to the challenge of investigating moral imagination in empirical research (Caldwell and Moberg 2007). Despite the lack of consensus, a review of the literature on moral imagination suggests that a series of relatively similar definitions have been provided (see Table 1 below).

Moral Imagination According to Werhane

As part of Werhane's initial discussion of moral imagination, some historical origins are provided. Werhane suggests that the earliest contributors were Adam Smith¹ and Immanuel Kant,² followed by a series of more recent contributors including Price (1983); Nussbaum (1990); Kekes (1991); and Tivnan (1995).³ The biggest influence for Werhane however was provided through Mark Johnson's (1993) book *Moral Imagination*.⁴

Werhane (1999: 5) indicates that her aim is to develop some fresh insights on two basic questions: (1) "Why do ordinary, decent managers engage in questionable behavior?" and (2) "Why do successful companies ignore the ethical dimensions of their processes, decisions, and actions?" To answer these

Table 1: Definitions of Moral Imagination

Author(s)	Definition of Moral Imagination
#Powers and Vogel 1980: 40	"The ability to perceive that a web of competing economic relationships is, at the same time, a web of moral or ethical relationships."
#Larmore 1981: 284–285	"Our ability to elaborate and appraise different courses of action which are only partially determined by the given content of moral rules, in order to learn what in a particular situation is the morally best thing to do."
#Jacobs 1991: 25	"Articulating and examining alternatives, weighing them and their probable implications, considering their effects on one's other plans and interests, and considering their possible effects on the interests and feelings of others."
#Johnson 1993: 202	"An ability to imaginatively discern various possibilities for acting within a given situation and to envision the potential help and harm that are likely to result from a given action."
#Vidaver-Cohen 1998: 124	"(a) Becoming aware of the social, economic, organizational or personal factors that affect perception of a business problem, and understanding how these might conflict. (b) reframing the problem from various perspectives to understand the potential impact of different solutions, (c) developing alternatives to solve the problem that can be morally justified by others outside the firm."
#Hartman et al. 2005: 346	"The subset of imagination that has as its subject explicitly moral constructions [and] that permits us to create worlds that are either morally better or worse than the world as we find it."
#Mahmood and Ali 2011: 1466	"The mental ability to create or use ideas, images, discern moral aspects implanted within a situation and develop a range of possible solutions of the situation from a moral point of view."
#Hartman et al. 2014: 576	"When one is facing an ethical decision, the ability to envision various alternative choices, consequences, resolutions, benefits, harms."
#Godwin 2015: 258	"The ability to discern the aspects embedded within a situation and develop a range of alternative solutions to the situation from a moral perspective."
#Rozuel 2016: 44	"A more applied form of imagination which purports to overcome unintentional harm caused by a lack of self-awareness of one's biases or prejudices. . . . Its aim is to enhance decision-making."

questions, which might be considered among the most important descriptive questions in the field of business ethics, Werhane discusses the common reasons provided to explain managerial unethical behavior: (1) human nature being based on self-interest or "good old fashioned greed"; (2) a low level of moral development; (3) a lack of proper moral education for managers (e.g., workshops on moral reasoning); and/or (4) the abdication of moral responsibility. The abdication of moral responsibility can occur according to Werhane due to: (i) a conflation of what is legal with what is expected morally; (ii) identifying professional responsibility (e.g., lawyers or accountants working within business firms following professional codes of ethics) with organizational responsibility; and/or (iii) subordinating moral responsibility with an inappropriate reliance on role responsibility.⁵

While Werhane finds that each of these factors is necessary and important in order to explain the occurrence of unethical events, she also argues that none is sufficient to completely account for moral irresponsibility. Werhane then proposes her thesis, that the key missing element in many instances of alleged corporate or managerial misconduct is the phenomenon of moral imagination.

Prior to suggesting her own definition of moral imagination, Werhane refers to Carroll (1987) who indicates that the capacity for moral imagination is the first of several essential moral capabilities for the moral manager.⁶ Werhane (1999: 5) starts with Carroll's definition of moral imagination:

Moral imagination refers to the ability to perceive that a web of competing economic relationships is, at the same time, a web of moral or ethical relationships. Developing moral imagination means becoming sensitive to ethical issues in business decision making, but it also means searching out places where people are likely to be hurt by decision making or behavior of managers. This moral imagination is a necessary first step, but because of prevailing methods of evaluating managers on bottom-line results, it is extremely challenging. It is essential, however, before anything else can happen. (Carroll's 1987: 13)

Building on this definition, Werhane more fully and clearly defines moral imagination as follows:

Moral imagination . . . is the ability in particular circumstances to discover and evaluate possibilities not merely determined by that circumstance, or limited by its operative mental models, or merely framed by a set of rules or rule-governed concerns. In managerial decision-making, moral imagination entails perceiving norms, social roles, and relationships entwined in any situation. Developing moral imagination involves heightened awareness of contextual moral dilemmas and their mental models, the ability to envision and evaluate new mental models that create new possibilities, and the capability to reframe the dilemma and create new solutions in ways that are novel, economically viable, and morally justifiable. (Werhane 1999: 93)

A review of Werhane's definition along with the other definitions listed in Table 1 above reveals that there are three common aspects of the process of moral imagination leading to the following cumulative definition: (1) understanding and then reframing⁷ the situation outside of its current context; (2) envisioning all of the possible alternatives⁸ along with their potential impacts;⁹ and (3) applying moral standards¹⁰ to the various alternatives to determine the best course of action.¹¹

Werhane's primary contribution to ethical decision-making theory is arguably her efforts to directly link moral imagination with decision making in a business context.¹² For Werhane, moral imagination can be applied directly to business decision making at two different levels. The first level applies to organizations as an entire entity, while the second applies to individual-level decision making by agents operating within or on behalf of organizations.

To better explain and illustrate the concept of moral imagination and the different levels of individual and organizational decision making, Werhane discusses a series of actual managerial and corporate examples which demonstrate a lack of moral imagination including Kidder Peabody's fraudulent trading by Joseph Jett, recall coordinator Dennis Gioia and the deadly Ford Pinto vehicle, MiniScribe's fraudulent sale of disk drives to IBM, Beech-Nut's sale of unnatural apple juice, Nestlé's sale of infant formula in countries in East Africa, NASA's Challenger space shuttle disaster involving booster rocket supplier Morton Thiokol, and Salomon Brothers' treasury bond incident. In each of these examples, decision makers failed to exercise moral imagination which if properly applied might have led to the scandal or unethical conduct being avoided.

Werhane also provides examples of moral imagination being employed, or what might be referred to as "imaginative right-doing" (Litz 2000: 256). These examples include Levi Strauss deciding to leave China, Johnson & Johnson recalling its Tylenol capsules, Merck's decision to make the non-profitable river blindness pill, Aaron Feuerstein of textile manufacturer Malden Mills voluntarily continuing to pay his workers while his factories were being rebuilt, and South Shore Bank's shift to reinvesting in the nearby community neighborhood. In another article, Werhane and Moriarty (2009) illustrate how moral imagination was used in relation to Google's reinvention of its Google Earth product to provide information on the Darfur humanitarian disaster, JetBlue's handling of a crisis following an ice storm leaving thousands of stranded pilots, crew, and passengers, and the *New York Times* actions in relation to retaining product quality and trust following a plagiarism scandal. Now that the concept of moral imagination has been summarized, the empirical research that has been conducted on the construct will be reviewed.

Part Two: Empirical Research on Moral Imagination

As moral imagination has typically been defined as a process rather than as a character or personality trait,¹³ it has found difficulty finding its way into the body of empirical research examining individual and situational factors potentially influencing ethical decision making (see Ford and Richardson 1994; Loc

et al. 2000; O'Fallon and Butterfield 2005; Craft 2013; Lehnert et al. 2015). Yet despite the paucity of empirical research on moral imagination, at least five empirical studies have been published (Caldwell and Moberg 2007; McVea 2009; Mahmood and Ali 2011; Whitaker and Godwin 2013; Godwin 2015). The following will briefly summarize these studies which tend to address three research questions: (1) how can moral imagination be measured? (2) what are the antecedents to moral imagination? and (3) does moral imagination influence ethical decision making?

How Can Moral Imagination Be Measured?

A few empirical studies have now attempted to measure the construct of moral imagination. In conducting possibly the first empirical study on moral imagination, Caldwell and Moberg (2007) measure moral imagination from their respondents based on three dimensions: (1) the use of ethics language in responses including terms such as 'ethics' or 'social responsibility'; (2) 'perspective taking,' meaning the articulation of the interests of multiple parties besides the company; and (3) the consideration of unconventional alternatives, meaning that actions were considered that were inconsistent with the existing manner in which the firm was dealing with the issue.

Godwin (2015) develops an even more sophisticated means to measure moral imagination by breaking the concept down into two inter-related factors: (i) discerning and (ii) developing. 'Discerning' is measured along two dimensions, issue awareness, which measures respondents' ability to recognize moral issues within the situation, and impact awareness, which measures respondents' ability to recognize who else would be affected by their actions. Godwin (2015) indicates that higher scores suggest a greater awareness for different stakeholder groups who would be affected by the decision being made. 'Developing' as a factor is determined based on two dimensions: fluency and flexibility. 'Fluency' is based on the volume of ideas generated or the number of ideas produced, while 'flexibility' is based on the number of different categories of ideas generated.

Whitaker and Godwin (2013: 66) measure moral imagination through the responses to three questions: "(1) identify as many ways as you can think of to take action on this situation; (2) describe the underlying moral issues that are important to consider when deciding on which actions to take in this situation; and (3) identify who you think will be impacted by your decision and how they will be impacted." Overall, each of these research survey questions for moral imagination measure respondents' concern over impacts on others along with the ability to generate a wide range of possible alternatives when faced with an issue.

Antecedents to Moral Imagination

A series of studies have now examined several antecedents to moral imagination. Caldwell and Moberg (2007) examined the individual antecedent of moral identity based on the extent to which people define themselves in moral terms, as well as the situational factor of organizational culture, meaning a culture that makes ethics salient. Caldwell and Moberg (2007) found that while culture was directly related to moral imagination, moral identity was surprisingly not related. Whitaker and Godwin (2013) also examined the antecedents to moral imagination and find that the variables of moral attentiveness and creativity are positively associated with moral imagination. In terms of moral attentiveness, they found that individuals who persistently perceive and consider morality and moral elements in everyday experiences are more likely to imaginatively discern various moral possibilities for acting in a particular situation. They also found that employee creativity not only has an effect on moral imagination, but also strengthens the association between moral attentiveness and moral imagination.

A study by McVea (2009) examined the type of decision maker and found that entrepreneurs exercised a much higher degree of moral imagination than MBA students. Contrary to the finding of Caldwell and Moberg (2007), McVea (2009) found that entrepreneurs tended to select a moral identity of an integrated human being guided strongly by their personal values, to frame the problem as primarily ethical at the outset. Entrepreneurs also tended to use a series of techniques through which they imaginatively explored, interpreted and made personal connections to the problem. MBA students on the other hand displayed a lower degree of moral imagination than entrepreneurs by framing the problems presented as primarily financial in nature with a narrower range of stakeholders' perspectives.

In terms of the sorts of personality characteristics of decision makers, Mahmood and Ali (2011) found that moral imagination is significantly positively associated with the characteristic of empathy.¹⁴ They indicate that when a person is empathetic, they tend to be able to feel the pain of the people in the particular situation leading to an ability to recognize the moral issues inherent in the situation. Mahmood and Ali (2011) also found that egotism¹⁵ and dogmatism¹⁶ have a negative relationship with moral imagination. They suggest that the egocentric person is never able to discern any kind of moral issue because he or she likes his own personality too much, while dogmatic people believe that one in general should not question authority, which is why they possess more limited thinking and bounded imagination.

Does Moral Imagination Influence Ethical Decision Making?

One of the more important empirical questions is whether moral imagination actually affects ethical decision making. Mahmood and Ali (2011) conduct an empirical study that examines the impact of moral imagination on mutually beneficial decisions, rather than try to measure ethical behavior. 'Mutually beneficial decision' is defined as a situation whereby the organization is both profitable and working for the benefit of society and is strategically focused on both stakeholder interests as well as organizational self-interests (i.e., both social and economic). Mahmood and Ali (2011) found in their study that mutually beneficial decision making is directly associated with moral imagination.

Another important empirical study by Godwin (2015) also found that individuals who are exercising moral imagination, including the ability to discern moral issues and develop a wide range of possible outcomes during the decision-making process, are more likely to generate a mutually beneficial outcome for a situation compared to those who do not exercise moral imagination. Godwin (2015: 267) also discovered different categories of respondents: the 'morally imaginative' group (i.e., strong discerning and developing abilities) and the 'nonmoral imagination' group (i.e., low scores on either discerning or developing or both). Godwin found that only eleven percent of the respondents were found to be in the morally imaginative group, while 89 percent were in the nonmoral imagination group.

Summary of Empirical Research

Overall, there appears to be a consensus developing that exercising moral imagination can improve mutually beneficial decision making (Mahmood and Ali 2011; Godwin 2015). There may be several antecedents to moral imagination, including moral identity (Caldwell and Moberg 2007), moral attentiveness and creativity (Whitaker and Godwin 2013), as well as corporate culture (Caldwell and Moberg 2007). Entrepreneurs (McVea 2009) and empathetic individuals (Mahmood and Ali 2011) tend to be more morally imaginative, while dogmatic or egocentric individuals are less morally imaginative (Mahmood and Ali 2011) along with MBA students (McVea 2009). While there is significant room for additional empirical research on moral imagination, an initial basis for further exploration has at least been provided for future empirical researchers including initial measures for moral imagination and mutually beneficial decisions. Now that the empirical research has been reviewed, attention will be shifted to how moral imagination can theoretically assist understanding, if not improving, the ethical decision-making process.

Part Three: Ethical Decision-Making Theory and Moral Imagination

An extensive body of theoretical research now exists in terms of explaining the process of ethical decision making (see Treviño et al. 2006; Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008; Schwartz 2016). The framework to be used for our purposes is the four-component model of Rest (1984; 1986). This framework posits that there are four distinct process components or stages of ethical decision making: (1) becoming aware that there is a moral issue or ethical problem or that the situation has ethical implications; (2) leading to a moral judgment; (3) establishing a moral motivation or intention to act; and (4) then acting on these intentions through one's behavior. Rest's model (1984; 1986) has retained its significance as the dominant ethical decision-making framework currently in use by most ethical decision-making researchers (e.g., Ferrell et al. 1989; Jones 1991; Dedek 2015). While an initial attempt to integrate moral imagination with Rest's (1986) ethical decision-making model has been conducted (see Moberg and Seabright 2000), the next section of the paper will further explore such linkages.

Moral Awareness and Moral Imagination

The first stage of ethical decision making, moral awareness, has a distinct overlap with moral imagination, however moral imagination pushes the definition and the scope of this stage further. Moral awareness is defined by Rest (1986: 3) as the "interpretation of the particular situation in terms of what actions [are] possible, who (including oneself) would be affected by each course of action, and how the interested parties would regard such effects on their welfare."¹⁷

When the definitions of moral awareness and moral imagination are compared, they appear almost identical. For example, Werhane's (1999) definition of moral imagination indicated above is based on one's awareness of the various dimensions of a particular context as well as its operative framework and narratives.¹⁸ There are other overlaps in the definitional components of moral awareness and moral imagination. Rest's (1986) definition includes the components of referring to a particular situation while Werhane refers to a particular context. In terms of alternatives, Rest (1986) refers to what actions are possible, while Werhane refers to the actualizing of new possibilities. While Rest (1986) refers to consideration of who, including oneself, would be affected and how the interested parties would regard such effects on their welfare, such normative considerations would be built into Werhane's process of evaluating those possibilities from a moral point of view.

The equivalence between Werhane's definition of moral imagination and Rest's definition of moral awareness is referred to explicitly by Godwin (2015)

who proposes the moral imagination concept of discerning as being similar to the concept of moral awareness. Later Godwin (2015) states that she treats the terms discerning and moral awareness as essentially interchangeable, with each referring to an individual's ability to recognize the moral dilemmas and opportunities embedded within a situation. Godwin (2015) then refers to Rest's stage of moral awareness as being a necessary first step in the ethical decision-making process.

Werhane's definition of moral imagination suggests that there are two inter-related phases or dimensions of moral awareness, which extend Rest's (1986) definition. The first phase relates not only to understanding but to then be able to step outside of or break away from one's current narratives, scripts, frameworks, roles, or context, through reframing or disengaging.¹⁹ By doing so, one is then able to engage in the second phase, which is envisioning all of the possible alternatives from a moral perspective, meaning having an understanding of the impacts on others of each alternative.

If moral imagination does not equate with moral awareness, then it might at least be considered as a factor influencing the degree of moral awareness. For example, Roca (2010) believes that moral imagination contributes to a more elaborate moral awareness of a situation or dilemma, which then helps employees create potential courses of personal action. Moberg and Seabright (2000) remind us that moral imagination plays a role in each of the different aspects of moral awareness or sensitivity, first by identifying possible courses of action through moral mindfulness which may then highlight the moral significance of the situation, second by determining who warrants moral concern based on moral inclusion (as opposed to moral exclusion), and third by 'perspective taking' through empathizing with the position of others as one's own position. Moberg and Seabright (2000) then suggest that each of these three aspects of moral awareness can be enhanced by moral imagination.

Moral Judgment and Moral Imagination

The essence of moral imagination and its potential greatest contribution to enhancing ethical behavior might be considered to be located within the moral judgment stage of the ethical decision-making process. According to Carroll (1987), moral imagination is one of the major capacities or elements that are essential in making moral judgments. In addition, moral imagination has been referred to as a faculty that plays an important role in ethical decision making (Rozuel 2010), or as the emotional and critical components of moral deliberation (Roca 2010).

Rest (1984) defines moral judgment as figuring out what one should do by applying moral ideals to the situation to determine the moral course of action. Werhane similarly makes it clear that moral imagination is critical for proper or responsible moral reasoning to take place. Werhane states (1999: 90): "While I do not argue that all moral reasoning is grounded in the imagination, I conclude that moral imagination is a necessary ingredient in responsible moral judgment. Only through imagination can one project alternate ways to frame experience and thus broaden, evaluate, and even change one's moral point of view."

One of the key ways emphasized by Werhane for decision makers to engage in moral imagination leading to proper moral judgments is that the decision maker should consider the perspective of others. Werhane believes that moral imagination is about putting oneself into the shoes of the various stakeholders in order to develop a strategy for aligning them in ways that are mutually beneficial (Werhane and Moriarty 2009). This notion of Kant's categorical imperative or the Golden Rule is somewhat captured by Rest's (1986) definition of awareness in terms of the decision maker considering how the interested parties would regard such effects on their welfare.

Werhane seems to merge together the moral awareness and moral judgment stages of ethical decision making when she refers to the importance of considering alternatives from a normative or ethical perspective. Werhane (1999: 101) states that moral imagination deals with possibilities that have "a normative or prescriptive character; they concern what one ought to do, with right or wrong, with virtue, with positive or negative consequences, or with what common morality calls 'good' or 'evil.' This activity is imaginative when it explores a wide range of possibilities not merely explicit in the circumstances in question, or on the other hand, fully explicated by moral abstractions such as the categorical imperative or the principle of utility." By explicitly including normative considerations, Werhane's definition of moral imagination directly overlaps with the moral judgment stage of ethical decision making. Werhane clarifies however that moral imagination is just one important component of moral judgment, and that moral reasoning still represents the overarching factor in the process of reaching a proper moral judgment. Werhane believes that moral imagination is a necessary, but insufficient condition, for creative moral managerial decision making. She states that imagination alone can create fantasies that can become dominating with false narratives, and therefore moral reasoning is the crucial component in management decision making. Werhane (1999: 13) states that moral reasoning is an element that "depends on moral imagination as its driving force and on moral standards as its 'bottom line.'"

Another contribution of moral imagination to better understanding and facilitating the moral judgment stage of ethical decision making is the idea of possessing flexibility in the ethical assessment of the various alternatives. For example, Moberg and Seabright (2000) relate moral imagination to the moral judgment stage by claiming that moral imagination requires decision makers to exhibit flexibility in their use of criteria from the ethical traditions of rules, relationships, and caring. Caldwell and Moberg (2007) also provide a very broad description of how a moral judgment is determined through moral imagination by suggesting that moral imagination as a decision process merely needs to be consistent with any standard normative ethics formulation, such as stakeholder rights or utilitarianism. As a result, different moral judgments may all display moral imagination as long as they reflect a common set of thought processes. But at the end of the day, given that the concept is *moral* imagination, Caldwell and Moberg (2007) believe that the judgment must meet some standard of morality.

Moral imagination also introduces the intuitive or emotional aspect of reaching moral judgments (Rozuel 2016). The view that intuitions or emotions can play an important role in ethical decision making has become much more widely accepted by researchers (Damasio 1994; Dedeker 2015; Gaudine and Thorne 2001; Greene et al. 2001; Haidt 2001; Salvador and Folger 2009). Often intuitions and emotions are linked together, through concepts such as affective intuitions or gut feelings. The key moral emotion is that of empathy, which can arise when the decision maker imagines oneself in another person's situation (Mahmood and Ali 2011). According to Roca (2010), moral imagination initiates imaginative moral intuition that recognizes the moral content of a given situation, even when it is not easily evident, and creatively envisions its potential ramifications. The application of intuition is critical as part of the moral judgment stage: "during moral judgment, moral imagination provides the critical ability and flexibility to use moral criteria, and the intuition needed for moral judgment" (Roca 2010: 138). Emotions are also incorporated by Roca (2010: 138): "Rational and emotional elements join together in moral deliberation, and moral imagination illuminates them to create a more complete, critical, and personal scenario."²⁰

In summary, moral imagination still incorporates the key moral reasoning process of the moral judgment stage (Rest 1986), but expands moral judgment to include intuition, emotion (e.g., empathy), and flexibility in considering different moral perspectives. Given that a broader range of alternatives have been considered when moral imagination is exercised during the moral awareness stage, there is also a greater likelihood that a more responsible moral judgment among all of the various alternatives is reached.

Intention/Behavior and Moral Imagination

In addition to awareness and judgment, moral imagination can also play an important role during the moral intention stage of ethical decision making, although less so for the behavior stage. Moral intent has also been referred to as moral motivation or determination which Rest (1986) defines as giving priority to moral values above other personal values such that a decision is made to intend to do what is morally right. One way to understand intention, or giving priority to the moral alternative over other possible courses of action, might be based on the concept of moral identity. Moral identity can be defined as the integration of morality into one's self-concept (Moberg and Seabright 2000). Moral imagination, by focusing on the concept of moral identity, provides a mechanism by which a decision maker might be more likely to form a moral intention or motivation to act on one's moral judgment, rather than based on their own perceived self-interest or personal inclinations. Moral identity can motivate actions that are consistent with one's sense of moral identity, based on both social sanctions (anticipating social approval or avoiding social censure), or self-sanctions (the image of who we want to be or don't want to be).

Moberg and Seabright (2000) believe that moral imagination affects self-sanctions by creating, activating, and elaborating possible moral selves. In other words, those who are more morally imaginative will have a larger and more diverse array of referent others including subordinates, peers, friends, and family members, and would more likely apply the newspaper test to consider how their actions would be judged by others. Caldwell and Moberg (2007) believe that moral imagination may provide a triggering mechanism that ethical categories are pertinent, that additional viewpoints need to be considered, and that unconventional options may be relevant. Without moral imagination being exercised, the individual may simply focus on self-interest or what is best for the organization, and not develop ethical intentions to act.

The final stage of ethical decision making, behavior, also referred to as implementation or action, is defined by Rest (1986: 4–5) as having: "sufficient perseverance, ego strength, and implementation skills to be able to follow through on his/her intention to behave morally, to withstand fatigue and flagging will, and to overcome obstacles." According to Moberg and Seabright (2000), moral imagination is likely most difficult to comprehend during the action/implementation phase. While moral imagination is primarily instrumental only during the awareness, judgment, and intention stages, there is one aspect of moral imagination that might however relate to the behavior stage. Moral courage has been defined as the ability to act ethically or to resist pressures to act

unethically even when one is aware that there is a danger to oneself in doing so (Hannah et al. 2011). Courage is also referred to by Werhane (e.g., 1999: 117) in conjunction with moral imagination, suggesting that sometimes only with moral courage will decision makers be able to actualize their moral intentions such as standing up to unethical requests from one's manager or blowing the whistle on managerial or firm misconduct.

In summary, moral imagination can influence and enhance our understanding and application of each stage of the ethical decision-making process. The contribution of moral imagination to the ethical decision-making process includes enlarging one's ability to identify possible alternatives by transcending common moral boundaries and scripts (moral awareness), developing moral mindfulness (moral awareness), improving one's ability to determine when moral rules should be universally binding and when they should provide for flexibility (moral judgment), and assessing 'possible selves' that can reinforce intentions through social and self-sanctions and motivations (moral intention) (Markus and Nurius 1986; Moberg and Seabright 2000; Rozuel 2012).

Immoral Imagination?

Although the above discussion demonstrates the various ways in which moral imagination can enlighten our understanding of ethical decision making, there is a serious risk or danger when imagination is applied during the ethical decision-making process as well. In a book review on Werhane, Litz (2000: 258) indicates: "One important element of moral imagination must include understanding its immoral counter-part." Litz (2000) provides the example of Oscar Schindler, who, in saving 1,200 Jewish workers from certain death in Nazi concentration camps, "lied, stole, bribed, and probably committed countless other 'unethical' practices, as defined by many ethicists, yet few would deny him from Carroll's category of moral manager." In other words, unethical means may be used through the use of imagination.

There is far graver concern however with moral imagination, in that the use of imagination or creativity in decision making might actually lead to even more dangerous consequences or unethical ends. Several have commented on this concern. Rozuel (2012: 488) for example states the problem as follows: "Imagination is a thoroughly ambivalent concept, which can be used to pursue moral as well as immoral goals."²¹ Werhane points out that Joseph Jett, the fraudulent Kidder Peabody trader, was imaginative, but behaved in a morally questionable manner. Others have also noted that immoral imagination was used by Enron executives in concealing Enron's debt through clever accounting tricks (Michaelson 2005; Rozuel 2016).

Immoral imagination was initially noted as an important concern by Jacobs (1991). Jacobs points out the example of an individual who is an uncompromising racist who loves to hate and takes pleasure in humiliating and frustrating others. Such a person, as part of contemplating and then witnessing the suffering of others, has an active and vivid immoral imagination. Immoral imagination is also connected to workplace deviance and can relate to actions such as aggression and violence, retaliation, sabotage, and theft (Seabright and Schminke 2002). Moral and immoral forms of imagination can essentially be distinguished in terms of whether the decision maker positively values the other's well-being as an end in itself (i.e., moral imagination), or whether the decision maker positively values the others' suffering as an end in itself (i.e., immoral imagination) (Seabright and Schminke 2002).

Immoral imagination can also play a role during each of the various ethical decision-making process stages. As indicated by Seabright and Schminke (2002: 24), in terms of moral awareness or sensitivity, immoral imagination may broaden the possible courses of action to include illegitimate alternatives. In determining who is affected, immoral imagination may lead to actively excluding others rather than leading to moral inclusion. In terms of perspective-taking, empathy might be a component of cruelty by knowing what the victim is feeling in order to maximize the victim's suffering. According to Seabright and Schminke (2002), the distinctive features of immoral imagination include demonization and active exclusion, utilitarian empathy, and vindictory judgment. Immoral imagination may even assist in transforming a morally deficient option into a perceived moral right or obligation which is then justified.

Intention can be affected by immoral imagination when social sanctions and self-sanctions motivate the selection of an immoral alternative. Rather than seeing unethical behavior as a failure of moral reasoning, the concept of immoral imagination supports the view that misconduct can also be seen as an active or even creative process (Seabright and Schminke 2002). Clearly imagination has an important role to play in ethical decision making, however the risks of immoral imagination being exercised must also always remain of concern.

Moral Imagination and Behavioral Ethics

Behavioral ethics, defined as understanding how people actually behave when confronted with ethical dilemmas (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 2011), is becoming more relevant in understanding the ethical decision-making process (Treviño et al. 2006; Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008; Prentice 2014). Behavioral ethics includes discussion of the biases, psychological tendencies, and moral

rationalizations that can influence and often prevent ethical behavior from taking place. Given its growing importance in the business ethics field (Bazerman and Gino 2012), the following section will discuss how behavioral ethics also relates to moral imagination.

The first important process in behavioral ethics that can restrict moral imagination and thereby moral awareness is moral disengagement (Bandura 1999), whereby a person convinces themselves in a particular context that ethical standards do not apply. Moral disengagement occurs when the activation of self-regulatory mechanisms or moral self-sanctions (i.e., one's conscience) is prevented due to a "restructuring of inhumane conduct into a benign or worthy one by moral justification, sanitizing language, and advantageous comparison; disavowal of a sense of personal agency by diffusion or displacement of responsibility; disregarding or minimizing the injurious effects of one's actions; and attribution of blame to, and dehumanization of, those who are victimized" (Bandura 1999: 193). Other similar processes or means by which one may not be morally aware include ethical fading (Tenbrunsel and Messick 2004), ethical blindness (Palazzo et al. 2012), ethical blindspots (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 2011), or moral myopia (Drumwright and Murphy 2004).

Another important means of restricting moral imagination is due to non-moral (legal or economic) decision frames. This takes place when one focuses on the economic or legal implications of an issue rather than on the ethical considerations, which can increase the chances of engaging in unethical behavior (Hosmer 2008; Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008; Dedeke 2015). The process of non-moral framing leading to a lack of awareness can result due to insufficient or biased information gathering, or socially constructing the facts in a particular manner (Sonenshein 2007). Werhane also makes numerous references to improper framing in relation to moral imagination. In relation to the sale of the defective Ford Pinto vehicle, Werhane suggests that the corporate culture at Ford did not facilitate managers framing the issue properly in terms that would raise questions about the viability of continuing to sell a defective and dangerous automobile. In relation to moral imagination leading to a lack of moral awareness, Werhane states (1999: 62): "A certain mental model develops or is adopted that frames the scenario in which one is operating so that often we fail to see the limitations and finite perspectives, even distortions, of our worldview."

There are a series of other biases and psychological tendencies that can impact moral imagination, some of which Werhane refers to. For example, Werhane refers to obedience to authority which is defined as follows: "Individuals when given a set of instructions by a person of authority, will often

carry out these instructions, even when they are absurd, immoral, dangerous, or life-threatening” (Werhane and Moriarty 2009: 15). Werhane also refers to groupthink, or when “a community narrative is so powerful that it remains unquestioned” (Werhane and Moriarty 2009: 16). This can lead to “illusions of invulnerability or moral superiority, which create organizational blind spots, crippling an individual’s ability to make good decisions” (Werhane and Moriarty 2009: 16). Other biases that can impact moral imagination may include incrementalism (i.e., initially taking small unethical steps leading to larger ones), moral equilibrium (i.e., justifying one’s unethical actions based on prior good deeds), and the tangible versus the abstract (i.e., the inability to see indirect harm) (see Prentice 2014). Each of these biases or psychological tendencies can block one’s ability to consider impacts on others or be able to identify morally appropriate alternatives.

A variety of moral rationalizations can also impact moral imagination, including denial of responsibility, denial of the injury to the victim, denial of the victim (i.e., the victim is to blame), condemn the condemners (i.e., one is being unfairly attacked), appeal to higher authorities (act is acceptable because one has selfless motives), everyone else is doing it, claim to entitlement (i.e., one is above the law), and the prohibition should not apply because it is no longer relevant (see Anand et al. 2005; Heath 2008). Each of these moral rationalizations can prevent, deactivate, or neutralize one’s ability to engage in proper moral imagination.

In summary, moral imagination can be defined as the process of determining and then moving towards the way things *should be*, rather than simply accepting the way things *are*. It involves constant mindfulness, reflection, and discerning all of the possible options for each situation one is facing including who might be affected depending on what decision is made or action taken. Moral imagination has an important normative basis as presupposed by Werhane, meaning that after one discerns they are facing an ethical dilemma (realizing others may be impacted), one continuously goes beyond acquiescing or accepting what *is* currently done (our current mental scripts or schemas), to reflect using one’s imagination on what *can* be done (envisioning all of the possible alternatives),²² to determine what *should* be done (based on considering who is impacted through proper moral reasoning and overcoming biases and psychological tendencies). Finally, one must ensure that what should be done is *actually* done (based on moral courage and overcoming moral rationalizations), and then to learn from the decision-making experience to avoid any future mistakes. The ethical decision-making process when enhanced by moral imagination is portrayed below (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Moral Imagination [MI] and Ethical Decision Making

Part Four: Future Research Directions

In terms of future research directions, moral imagination should continue to be investigated to see if there is in fact an influence or moderating effect on the ethical decision-making process. In their summary of the research on the factors influencing ethical decision making, O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005) conclude that moral imagination can moderate aspects of ethical decision making. They state: “once individuals establish moral awareness, they may be more likely to make a moral judgment if they are able to successfully imagine alternative actions and their implications for affected parties. Similarly, the relationship between judgment and intent may be strengthened if the individual is able to

successfully identify and consider the other party's feelings and interests" (2005: 402–403). Thus, the various aspects of moral imagination should continue to be empirically examined in relation to each of the various stages of ethical decision making.

The antecedents of moral imagination should also be further investigated in future research, given that Werhane does not explore this question and that relatively few factors potentially contributing to moral imagination have been examined beyond moral identity (Caldwell and Moberg 2007) and creativity (Whitaker and Godwin 2013; McVea 2009). Further research on the potential impact of various demographic variables in relation to one's level or capacity for moral imagination (e.g., age, gender, nationality, education, work experience, religiosity, personality type, etc.) should also be undertaken. How the capacity for moral imagination is acquired should also be further explored. For example, Moberg (2001) asks whether the habit of moral imagination is a virtue, and whether one acquires moral imagination through practice and role modeling. Research on each of these questions will lead to a more robust moral imagination construct.

The linkage between corporate culture and moral imagination is also important (Caldwell and Moberg 2007) and needs to be further studied. Engaging in team decision making in organizations may also enhance moral imagination. For example, Godwin asks (2015) how team collaboration can impact the demonstration of moral imagination. Whether team decision making may enhance or possibly diminish moral imagination should also therefore be examined. Other possible linkages should be explored including those between moral imagination and ethical leadership (e.g., Hicks and Waddock 2016).

Additional research on immoral imagination would better enhance our understanding of the ethical decision-making process. As discussed above, immoral imagination can be a powerful contributor to individuals and organizations conceiving of highly creative schemes or engaging in complex and often hidden practices that ultimately lead to significant harm to others. While Werhane does not explicitly discuss the phenomenon of immoral imagination, the reasons and the manner in which immoral imagination is utilized by individuals and business organizations should also be further investigated by researchers.

Finally, the extent to which moral imagination is related to organizational-level decision should be further developed in theory building and examined through additional empirical research. While Werhane focuses her earlier works primarily on individuals and individual moral judgments, she later suggests that by applying a "systems thinking" approach (i.e., interdependent elements,

subsystems, and networks of relationships within an organization), moral imagination can be seen not merely as a function of an individual's imagination, but operates on organizational and systemic levels as well (Werhane 2002). Other scholars have also begun to suggest that moral imagination can be applied at the organizational decision-making level via corporate social responsibility (CSR) (e.g., Mahmood and Ali 2011) or corporate crisis management (e.g., Christensen and Kohls 2003). Moral imagination may also have implications in relation to the CSR-related notion of creating social value (CSV) advocated by Porter and Kramer (2011), in that only by creatively expanding the range of possible alternatives can companies envision solutions that generate both social and economic value for the communities in which they operate (see Hartman and Werhane 2013). Given the potential normative and descriptive explanatory power of moral imagination, further work on its application at the organizational decision-making level should certainly take place.

Teaching and Managerial Implications

Assuming that moral imagination contributes to ethical decision making, the next question is whether this ability or process can be taught to managers, employees, and business students. The answer is that moral imagination can be taught but only if a multi-prong approach is taken through: (1) management education; (2) the development of ethics programs (including ethics training); and (3) moral consultation.

Management Education

There has unfortunately been a limited degree of discussion over the use of moral imagination in management education, despite Werhane's view that moral imagination can be taught (Werhane and Moriarty 2009). Both Von Weltzien Hoivik (2004) and Ravenscroft and Dillard (2008) recommend the use of moral imagination in the classroom. Ravenscroft and Dillard state: "Operationally, we must help students develop their moral imagination by honing their powers of discrimination, encouraging them to envision new possibilities, and to creatively consider the implications of the imaginative structures" (Ravenscroft and Dillard 2008: 186). Godwin (2015) also believes that for business education, pedagogy needs to be developed that most effectively helps students build and reinforce the skills of discerning moral issues and developing a range of alternatives, which they suggest can include experiential learning activities or case studies. Rozuel (2016) similarly recommends that moral imagination and

enhanced ethical reflection be taught through writing and enacting stories in business ethics courses.

The teaching philosophy of Giving Voice to Values (GVV), or how to speak your mind when you know what's right, might also be used in conjunction with moral imagination when teaching students or training managers across all of the stages of ethical decision making. 'Giving Voice to Values' means the following:

The main idea behind Giving Voice to Values (GVV) is the observation that a focus on *awareness* of ethical issues and [an] *analysis* of what the right thing to do maybe is insufficient. Precious little time is spent on *action*—that is, developing the 'scripts' and implementation plans for responding to the commonly heard 'reasons and rationalizations' for questionable practices, and actually practicing the delivery of those scripts. GVV is all about this neglected area of scripts and action plans and practice: building the skills, the confidence, the moral muscle, and frankly the *habit* of voicing our values. (Gentile 2010: xiii)

There appears to be a significant overlap between moral imagination and Giving Voice to Values. Giving Voice to Values seems to incorporate a degree of imagination (if not moral imagination) in finding the best manner or approach by which to actualize moral judgments and intentions. While moral imagination focuses on the awareness, judgment, and intention stages, GVV focuses on moving from judgment and intentions (values) to actions (giving voice). Both GVV and moral imagination can thus be used together in a complementary if not sequential manner when teaching students or managers to think outside the box during each of the four stages of ethical decision making.

Corporate Culture and Ethics Programs

In addition to Werhane, several others have raised the question whether corporate culture and ethics programs can impact or be influenced by moral imagination. According to De Colle and Werhane (2008), moral imagination can provide a unifying approach to support a more effective implementation of ethics programs within business organizations in relation to ethics training based on case studies and corporate mottos. Mahmood and Ali (2011) suggest that training, workshops and other programs should be organized to help raise and cultivate moral imagination. Godwin (2015) outlines the manner in which a culture can be developed that fosters individuals' ability to engage in moral imagination (i.e., discern moral issues and develop a range of alternatives). This can take place by incorporating the evaluation of these abilities into performance appraisals or designing training programs that specifically focus on cultivating

moral imagination, with the goal to help strengthen an employee's ability to create mutually beneficial decisions.

Other recommendations that have been made in relation to moral imagination and corporate culture include: (1) facilitate interaction within the organization between individuals who understand multiple frameworks; (2) create a culture of pushback and shared responsibility to avoid the phenomenon of obedience to authority; and (3) ensure diversity in terms of race, gender, cultural background, and personality/modes of thinking to develop leaders who can criticize the organization internally before a public relations scandal arises (Werhane and Moriarty 2009).

Moral Consultation

One additional potential process that can impact one's level of moral imagination during the judgment, intention, or behavior stages is that of "moral consultation." Moral consultation is defined as the active process of reviewing ethics-related documentation (e.g., codes of ethics) or discussing to any extent one's situation with others in order to receive guidance or feedback in relation to one's ethical dilemma (Schwartz 2016). While it is clear that not all individuals will engage with others in helping to determine the appropriate course of action, any degree of discussion with colleagues, managers, family members, friends, or ethics officers or review of ethics documentation when facing an ethical dilemma would constitute moral consultation.

Moral consultation as a procedural step of ethical decision making, while not incorporated into the dominant ethical decision making models, is referred to by some ethical decision-making theorists (see Sonenshein 2007; Hamilton and Knouse 2011; Haidt 2001; 2007). Mahmood and Ali (2011: 1469) refer to moral consultation in relation to moral imagination: "While taking any decision, if an individual considers the ethical views and expressions of experts and practitioners, the moral agent will be able to critically analyze the situation from all possible angles. After having a deeper insight to the problem, alternative strategies will be used to achieve the desired ethical outcomes." In their recommendations to foster moral imagination, Werhane and Moriarty (2009) assert that consulting leaders outside the firm can be a great benefit to those in leadership positions. Moral consultation should be considered particularly important in an organizational setting given that firms often encourage and provide opportunities to their employees to discuss and seek ethical guidance from others or from ethics documentation (Weaver et al. 1999; Stevens 2008). While moral consultation is generally expected to improve one's level of moral imagination

and ethical decision making, it is important to remember that the opposite might also occur. One may discover through consultation that unethical behavior is considered acceptable to others, potentially increasing the likelihood of acting in an unethical manner.

Conclusion

Moral imagination provides a very important conceptual tool in further understanding as well as potentially enhancing the ethical decision-making process. The role of moral imagination in ethical decision making should not be overstated however. For example, it may be the case that moral imagination is not as relevant for moral temptation situations (see Kidder 1995), when the decision maker must decide between what is right and what is clearly wrong (e.g., steal from the supply cabinet) rather than true ethical dilemmas (i.e., right versus right) whereby either alternative can be supported by a set of ethical values. Caldwell and Moberg (2007: 201) hint at this when they state the following: "In our view, these types of problems [where there is as yet no accepted formula for dealing with specific conflict situations] represent decisions that are much more frequent and, in some ways, more consequential and interesting than those in which clear ethical and legal guidelines apply and therefore likely to be influenced by thought process[es] such as moral imagination." In other words, when one faces a true ethical dilemma, moral imagination may become much more relevant in the decision-making process.

Although there will no doubt continue to be debate over the extent to which moral imagination (or the lack thereof) influences ethical decision making, what is becoming clear through empirical research is that it does in fact play an important role. Werhane's discussion of moral imagination, building on previous works, has arguably provided the key theoretical bridge between moral imagination and ethical decision making in business. Werhane's contribution (along with others) has managed to put moral imagination into the business ethics lexicon, but whether it will continue to expand and develop as a useful research tool and business ethics teaching and managerial training construct remains to be seen. Hopefully the above discussion helps to move moral imagination in that direction.

Notes

1. Werhane discusses at length Adam Smith's view of sympathy (which came from the original concept of sympathy proposed by Smith's teacher David Hume), as an understanding of the sentiments of another by placing oneself in another's situ-

ation as if one is the other person: “one must first understand what another feels, or in the case of oneself, engage in imaginative self-evaluation of one’s own emotions that accompany the intention, or action” (Werhane 1999: 94).

2. Werhane (1999: 96–98) refers to Kant’s analysis of moral imagination to distinguish between three types: Reproductive imagination meaning awareness of one’s context, the script of that context, and the possible moral dilemmas that might arise in that context; productive imagination or revamping one’s schema to take into account new possibilities, and creative imagination or free reflection meaning the ability to envision, actualize, and evaluate those possibilities (see also Moberg and Seabright 2000: 846).

3. According to Caldwell and Moberg (2007: 193): “As a concept first derived in philosophy (Kekes 1991; Nussbaum 1990; Tivnan 1995), moral imagination represents a theoretical point of departure from the practice of describing the ethical decision-making process with constructs borrowed from psychology” and might provide the missing link “between philosophy and social science in business ethics.”

4. Werhane (1999: ix) states: “The project was further inspired by Mark Johnson’s *Moral Imagination*, a book that helped to focus my thinking about imagination in an applied context. This book is an outcome of those ruminations, and I am gratefully indebted to Mark Johnson for his insights.”

5. Role responsibility includes for example “the managerial role pressure to be competitive, efficient, and profitable” (Werhane 1999: 31).

6. Carroll’s definition of moral imagination is in turn based on Powers and Vogel (1980: 40). Carroll (1987: 11) distinguishes between moral managers who possess the capacity for moral imagination and intentional and unintentional amoral managers. See Carroll (1987: 12) for a complete description of each type of manager.

7. ‘Reframing’ (Werhane 1999: 93) has also been referred to as ‘revamping’ (Werhane 1998: 85), ‘disengagement’ (Werhane 1999: 101), or ‘having different perspectives’ (Werhane 1999: 5).

8. ‘Alternatives’ has also been referred to as ‘courses of action’ (Larmore 1981: 284–285), ‘possibilities’ (Werhane 1999: 5; Johnson 1993: 202), ‘solutions’ (Mahmood and Ali 2011: 1466), or ‘choices’ (Hartman et al. 2014: 576).

9. ‘Potential impacts’ have also been referred to as ‘consequences,’ ‘benefits,’ ‘harms’ (Hartman et al. 2014: 576), and ‘effects’ (Jacobs 1991: 25).

10. ‘Moral standards’ (Werhane 1999: 13) have also been referred to as ‘moral rules’ or ‘moral constructions’ (Harman et al. 2014: 346), ‘moral aspects’ (Mahmood and Ali 2011: 1466), ‘ethical relationships’ (Powers and Vogel 1980: 40), and ‘moral point of view’ (Werhane 1999: 5).

11. ‘Best course of action’ has also been referred to as ‘the best thing to do’ (Larmore 1981: 284–285).

12. Moral imagination is a concept that has also been applied to other different spheres of decision making or activity, including politics (Byrne 2011), health care (Werhane 2006), and everyday decision making (Johnson 1993). United States President Barack Obama referred to moral imagination at the funeral of former Israeli President Shimon Peres in 2016: "There are few people who we share this world with who change the course of human history, not just through their role in human events, but because they expand our moral imagination and force us to expect more of ourselves. My friend Shimon was one of those people" (Office of the White House Press Secretary, "Statement by the President," September 27, 2016; available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/27/statement-president-death-former-israeli-president-shimon-peres-0>. Accessed March 6, 2017).

13. Rather than being an individual difference variable or personality characteristic, moral imagination is considered to be "a unique cognitive *process* that an individual applies when making a decision" (Whitaker and Godwin 2013: 63, emphasis added). It is not an automatic process, but instead "moral imagination is a conscious, voluntary cognitive process and, as such, its activation may be at the discretion of the decision-maker (Whitaker and Godwin 2013: 69).

14. Empathy is the "ability to imagine oneself in another person's situation" (Mahmood and Ali 2011: 1469).

15. Egotism is "an overconcentration of self-interest" (Mahmood and Ali 2011: 1470).

16. Dogmatism is "the belief that one should not question, but rather conform to authority" (Mahmood and Ali 2011: 1470).

17. Rest's (1984; 1986) first stage of ethical decision making is awareness, which has also been referred to as interpreting the situation, sensitivity, or recognition.

18. As further clarification, Werhane states (1999: 91): "At its most basic level, imagination is the ability to form mental images of real or unreal phenomena or events and to develop different scenarios or different perspectives on those phenomena or events."

19. Werhane (1999: 54) refers to several metaphors for disengaging from an accepted narrative, including the rhinoceros armor. This is based on the fact that an early artist's depiction in the sixteenth century of a rhinoceros with armor was accepted as being accurate until the eighteenth century, despite rhinos having no armor.

20. Roca (2010: 137) clarifies further the difference between moral imagination and moral reasoning: "moral imagination is not the same as moral reasoning; rather, it acts on moral deliberation as its emotional facet."

21. Rozuel also states the problem as follows: "A good imagination is also problematic if it is directed towards fulfilling evil goals" (2012: 489); and "Moral imagination is not a panacea, especially because a good imagination can also lead to immoral behaviour" (2012: 492).

22. "Moral imagination . . . means understanding what *is* but, more important, envisioning what *could be*" (Litz 2000: 257, emphasis added).

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Questions for Schwartz

1. Table 1 and note 9: Jacobs 1981: 25

The reference-list entry and the citation on page 312, line 7, have "1991," and the page number fits in the range given in the reference (23–37), so I changed "1981" to "1991" in these two locations. Please mark your proof if either of these is incorrect, and provide the missing reference for Jacobs 1981.

2. Page 299, six lines from the bottom of the page: "Mark Johnson's (1991) book *Moral Imagination*"
WorldCat.org doesn't list a 1991 edition for *Moral Imagination*, so I changed "1991" to "1993" here to match the reference-list entry.

3. Page 307, penultimate line: Rozuel 2010

Are you citing Rozuel 2012 or Rozuel 2016 here, or is there a reference missing?

4. Page 297, beginning in line 4 of the text: "a series of journal articles . . . Werhane 2009"

I guessed that you mean to cite Werhane and Moriarty 2009, and changed the citation accordingly. But is Werhane and Moriarty 2009 a journal article?

5. Page 299, seven lines from the bottom of the page, and note 3: Tivnan 1995

This work is missing from the reference list.

6. Page 311, line 2: Hannah et al. 2011

This work is missing from the reference list.

7. Page 313, second paragraph beginning on the page, line 5: Hosmer 2008

This work is missing from the reference list.

8. Note 7: "'Reframing' has also been referred to as revamping, disengage, or different perspectives."

This doesn't sound right to me so I changed it to:

"'Reframing' has also been referred to as 'revamping,' 'disengagement,' or 'having different perspectives.'"

Please see also similar changes in notes 8–11, and let me know if that's unacceptable for any reason, or if you feel it alters or obscures your meaning.

9. Note 21: Rozuel (2012: 492) also states the problem as follows: "A good imagination is also problematic if it is directed towards fulfilling evil goals" (2012: 489).

You've given two different citations for one quotation here. I deleted the first. Please mark your proof if that's incorrect.

